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From Washington to Post-Washington? Consensus Policies 
and Divergent Developments in Latin America and Asia 
by Rainer Schweickert and Rainer Thiele
Contents 
■  Most Latin American countries have made consid-
erable progress in implementing the core recom-
mendations of the Washington Consensus. The 
comparison with fast-growing Asian countries 
shows, however, that higher and more broad-
based growth can only be achieved with more 
comprehensive reforms which contain four im-
portant additional elements. 
■  First, external stability should be given priority in 
order to support export activities. More flexible ex-
change rates and the prudent use of capital mar-
ket policies could stabilize real exchange rates as 
well as capital inflows. At the same time, the need 
for capital inflows could be reduced by increasing 
domestic savings through higher government 
savings and efforts to overcome the segmentation 
of domestic capital markets. 
■  Second, the adoption of best-practice technolo-
gies should be encouraged in order to accelerate 
technical progress. Measures which could ease 
the transfer of technology are the use of FDI as a 
source of technology for export-oriented sectors 
and human capital formation with an emphasis on 
technical and job-related skills. More flexible labor 
markets could bring higher employment levels, 
which is important for mobilizing resources 
through learning-on-the-job.  
■  Third, poverty should be alleviated and inequality 
be reduced in order to broaden the participation of 
the population in economic activities and to facil-
itate the establishment of small and medium-sized 
firms. The highest priority should be given to a 
strong basic education system, labor market re-
forms which facilitate the migration from the in-
formal sector to higher-paid formal employment, 
and a comprehensive titling program for land and 
property which allows access to the formal credit 
market. 
■  Fourth, the formal institutional framework should 
be reliable in order to guarantee a certain degree 
of predictability. Only then investors will have an 
incentive to undertake projects with a longer 
gestation period. In addition, the establishment of 
informal institutions (social capital) should be en-
couraged in order to reduce transaction costs. 
This can best be achieved indirectly by means of 
targeted support for the poor which reduces the 
extent of social exclusion and polarization, a 
higher level of education which raises the accep-
tance of norms transcending narrow kin groups, 
and better formal institutions which constrain the 
ability of the government to act arbitrarily. 
■ Taken together, export orientation, technology 
transfer, poverty alleviation, and institution-build-
ing could allow developing a more flexible eco-
nomic structure and a more dynamic performance 
of investment and exports, which would in turn be 
reflected in higher and more equitable growth. In 
order to start such a process, the countries need 
to design their own strategies. This is because 
most reforms, especially institution-building, have 
to be tailored to domestic conditions. The poverty 
reduction strategy papers (PRSPs), which have to 
be set up by highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) 
in order to get debt reductions, could provide a 




INSTITUT FÜR WELTWIRTSCHAFT KIEL  •  Februar 2004 
Contents 
1  The Consensus Debate  3 
2  Necessary Conditions: The Washington Consensus  4 
2.1  Definition and Implementation of the Washington Consensus  4 
2.2  Exchange Rate Policy and Export Growth  8 
2.3  Capital Market Policy, Savings, and Investment  11 
3  Sufficient Conditions: The Quest for a Post-Washington Consensus  15 
3.1  Poverty Alleviation and Redistribution  15 
3.2  Human Capital Formation  17 
3.3  Institutional Reforms  19 
4  Towards Sustainable Catching-up Growth in Latin America  25 
Appendix Tables  28 



















The discussion paper is based on the final report for the research project “Macroeconomic Stabilization and 
Economic Growth in Emerging Market Economies” which the Kiel Institute for World Economics has completed 
for the Federal Ministry of Finance in December 2003. The authors thank Rolf J. Langhammer for valuable 
comments, Christiane Gebühr and Michaela Rank for technical support, and Sylvia Künne and Kerstin Stark for 
the final layout.  
1 The  Consensus  Debate 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the debate about 
the development problems of Latin American 
countries centers around what John Williamson 
labelled the Washington Consensus (Williamson 
1990). The formulation of the Consensus was 
driven by the demand for a checklist of reforms 
to be implemented by Latin American countries 
in order to guarantee that financial resources 
made available through debt reduction granted 
under the framework of the Brady plan would 
actually contribute to economic growth rather 
than feed capital flight. Given this background, 
John Williamson summarized those reforms 
which he thought to be undisputed among the 
majority of economic policy advisors, including 
the IMF and World Bank staff as well as the U.S. 
government.  
Thus, the Washington Consensus was meant 
to address only the specific problems of Latin 
American countries in the late 1980s. It does not 
deny alternative and more comprehensive ideas 
about development policies. In the public debate, 
however, the Washington Consensus was seen to 
represent the reform agenda of the international 
institutions, especially of the IMF. It came under 
attack during the Asian crisis when the IMF pro-
vided highly controversial policy advice which 
was believed to be based on the Consensus. Ad-
ditionally, it was asked why rapidly growing 
Asian countries and Latin American reform 
countries could come under pressure although 
they were thought to have followed the Wash-
ington Consensus. Especially in Latin American 
countries, the turnaround in capital flows de-
stroyed positive effects of reforms based on the 
Washington Consensus which had been small 
and disappointing anyway. 
The fact that the public debate linked the 
crises in emerging and developing market econ-
omies to the Washington Consensus led to the 
demand for a Post-Washington Consensus by 
international institutions and nongovernment or-
ganizations (see, e.g. Stiglitz 1998; Stallings and 
Peres 2000; Unmüßig and Walther 1999). Since 
then the debate has gone far beyond the initial 
idea of the Washington Consensus to define a 
necessary set of conditions for a special group of 
countries trying to regain access to the inter-
national capital markets in that it claims to arrive 
at sufficient conditions for an economic reform 
agenda conducive to sustainable catching-up 
growth (Schweickert 2003a). 
This report assesses the question to what ex-
tent the arguments put forward in the Washing-
ton Consensus and the Post-Washington Consen-
sus debate can help explain the different eco-
nomic performance of Latin American and Asian 
countries. Starting with the observation that it is 
the economic policy instruments rather than the 
reform targets which are heavily debated (see 
Kuczynski and Williamson 2003), the report 
shows that Latin America and fast-growing Asia 
indeed significantly differ with respect to all 
economic policy areas under consideration. As a 
consequence, a comparison of these groups of 
emerging market economies can actually help 
develop a comprehensive development strategy. 
Section 2.1 starts with an outline of the 
Washington Consensus policies (stabilization, 
opening up, liberalization). It links differences in 
the implementation of consensus policies and in 
the use of the heavily debated exchange rate 
and capital market policies to differences in the 
economic performance between selected Latin 
American and fast-growing Asian emerging 
market economies. Section 2.2 reports the debate 
on poverty alleviation and income distribution, 
human capital development, and institutional re-
forms, policy areas which proponents of the 
Post-Washington Consensus claim to be crucial 
for sustained and equitable growth. As in Section 
2.1, differences in performance and policies be-
tween Latin America and Asia are shown to be 
remarkably large. Chapter 3 summarizes the 
main results and tries to formulate a comprehen-




2  Necessary Conditions: The Washington Consensus 
2.1  Definition and Implementation of 
the Washington Consensus 
John Williamson formulated the Washington 
Consensus in ten points which can be sum-
marized as stabilization, opening up, and liber-
alization (Williamson 1996; see Box 1). The 
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) tried 
to measure the implementation of these policies in 
an Index of Structural Reforms (Lora 2001). 
Structural reforms were evaluated for nineteen 
Latin American countries for the period 1985–
1999. Table 1 shows the average results for all 
countries (LA-19), the country results and the 
average results for the seven major emerging mar-
kets Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela (LA-7), as well as the 
results for two low-income countries, Bolivia and 
Peru, which made considerable progress in most 
reform areas. Table 1 reveals three stylized facts 
about structural reforms in Latin America: 
•  A comparison of reform efforts in the 1980s 
and 1990s shows that the Washington Consen-
sus seems to have increased the speed of re-
forms. The exceptions are the areas “trade” 
(where the level of reforms had already been 
high), “taxation”, and “labor market” (an issue 
not mentioned explicitly in the Washington 
Consensus). 
• Low-income countries are catching up. The 
speed of reform in the 1990s was generally 
faster for this group, with the exception of 
“labor market” where no significant reforms 
have taken place in most Latin American 
countries.  
• Generally, reform indices show that Latin 
American countries made considerable pro-
gress with respect to those policies which have 
the highest priority in the Washington Con-
sensus, i.e., macroeconomic stabilization and 
trade liberalization. 
Box 1: 
The Washington Consensus 
Stabilization 
Fiscal Discipline: Public deficits should be so small that they can be financed without an inflation tax, i.e., by printing 
money. This implies a primary budget surplus that depends on the amount of debt accumulated. The total deficit after debt 
service should not exceed 2 percent of GDP. 
New Priorities for Fiscal Spending: Public expenditure should be restructured in favor of spending categories with high 
economic and social benefits. This implies less resources for administration, defense, subsidies, and state-owned enter-
prises and more resources for poverty alleviation, health, education, and infrastructure. 
Tax Reform: Taxes should be levied on a broader base and with lower tax rates, which implies an easier tax ad-
ministration. 
Opening Up 
Trade Liberalization: Quantitative restrictions on trade should be transferred into tariffs with a uniform tariff rate of 
between 10 and 20 percent. The transition process, which can last from 3 to 10 years, may be interrupted if required by 
macroeconomic imbalances. 
Exchange Rate Adjustment: At least for trade transactions, multiple exchange rates should be given up. The single ex-
change rate should be on a sustainable level that allows for the growth of nontraditional exports. 
Direct Investment: Foreign direct investment should not be restricted and should be treated like domestic investment. 
Liberalization 
Capital Market Liberalization: Interest rates should be set by the market. The precondition is that reliable institutions exist 
for controlling the domestic capital market. In case that this is not given, real interest rates should be positive and the same 
for borrowers with comparable risk. 
Privatization: State-owned enterprises should be privatized. 
Deregulation: The government should abolish regulations which restrict the entry of new enterprises and competition. 
Regulations are justified only concerning internal security, environmental protection, and the stability of the financial 
sector. 
Property Rights: The judicial system should supply reliable property rights at moderate costs, which are also accessible 
for the informal sector. 5 
Table 1:  
Index of Structural Reforms for Latin America, 1985–1999a 
 Argentina  Brazil  Chile  Costa 
Rica 
Mexico Uruguay  Venezuela LA-7  Bolivia  Peru  LA-19 
  Score 
D i f f e r e n c e s              
1990–85  13.0 17.1  8.2 11.9 13.4  0.3  5.9 10.0 17.6  5.6  9.5 
1999–90  14.8 18.0  3.6 13.2  8.7 10.5 17.1 12.3 22.4 32.4 14.7 
Averages             
1985–89  33.4 32.5 52.8 39.2 45.2 35.7 27.6 38.1 36.7 29.6 37.2 
1990–99  58.1 50.5 57.8 49.1 49.2 43.6 45.5 50.6 58.1 54.7 52.0 
  Trade 
D i f f e r e n c e s             
1990–85  11.8 50.2 17.7 45.6 26.4 13.7 21.3 26.7  5.0 27.8 24.0 
1999–90  6.3 26.4  0.9  9.1 –4.5 17.8 18.2 10.6  4.8 33.4 12.3 
Averages             
1985–89  53.8 30.9 87.4 70.8 76.1 63.0 44.4 60.9 86.4 29.3 60.8 
1990–99  85.4 78.4 94.8 86.3 85.4 84.8 81.5 85.2 94.6 82.4 84.6 
  Capital market 
D i f f e r e n c e s             
1990–85  39.9 10.9 19.3 –2.2 24.9 –3.9 11.7 14.4 54.2  8.7 12.7 
1999–90  39.4  8.9  0.2 52.2 31.2 28.4 16.1 25.2 30.9 48.1 30.8 
Averages             
1985–89  31.6 28.1 58.1 20.1 30.1 43.6 31.2 34.7 19.6 19.5 28.7 
1990–99  92.8 45.5 72.5 42.5 62.3 65.0 52.1 61.8 69.6 59.5 55.8 
  Taxation 
D i f f e r e n c e s             
1990–85  12.7   2.7   3.2   15.9   11.1   –7.7   0.5   9.0   29.9   –3.0   9.9  
1999–90  –6.0   0.7   3.3   2.9   –0.2   8.6   6.3   3.1   –14.6   15.9   5.3  
Averages             
1985–89  2.4   29.5   48.1  39.7   30.4   45.5   28.7   35.1   54.6   35.2   47.5  
1990–99  3.2  47.0   49.2   49.6   40.6   43.9   43.5   43.7   59.6   35.9   47.6  
  Privatization 
D i f f e r e n c e s             
1990–85  6.1  0.1   3.5   0.4   7.6   0.8   0.0   2.6   0.0   0.0   1.8  
1999–90  33.3   49.8   12.3   1.6   19.4   –0.4   26.7   20.4   90.4   60.3   23.9  
Averages             
1985–89  0.0   0.0   1.4   0.2   1.8   0.0   0.0   0.5   0.0   0.0   0.7  
1990–99  24.9  13.1   5.3   1.7   26.5   0.5   18.7   12.9   43.5   29.2   13.5  
  Labor market 
D i f f e r e n c e s             
1990–85  –0.5   –0.3   –0.4   0.0   –2.6   –1.2   –3.6   –2.3   –0.9   –5.2   –1.1  
1999–90  0.0   –0.2   –1.1   0.0   –2.8   –2.0   18.2   1.6   0.6   4.2   1.5  
Averages             
1985–89  5.7   7.4   69.2   65.4   34.9   26.3   33.3   51.4   23.0   64.0   58.9  
1990–99  5.5   6.9   67.5   65.4   31.3   23.8   31.8   49.0   23.2   66.2   58.4  
  Memorandum item: capital flows 
D i f f e r e n c e s             
1990–85  4.2  0.4   8.7   33.0   13.6   15.4   0.1   16.7   34.0   32.0   13.8  
1995–90  1.7   1.8   17.8   0.0   8.9   –1.5   14.7   10.6   –4.3   28.1   16.5  
Averages             
1985–89  46.0   44.0   51.6   78.4   69.4   65.0   78.0   61.8   83.6   31.1   59.9  
1990–95  95.3   53.5   65.9   100.0   82.9   76.4   88.2   80.3   91.1   84.9   77.9  
aThe total score is determined by the unweighted average of all factors but “capital flows”. The scale for each factor runs from 0 (worst 
figure in total panel) to 100 (best figure in total panel). 
Source: Lora (2001); Morley et al. (1999) for capital flows; own calculations. 6 
In its Global Competitiveness Report 2002–
2003, the World Economic Forum (WEF 2003) 
also analyzes these figures and argues that there 
have been reform efforts, but that they have 
not been correlated with economic performance 
(Larraín 2003). This is not surprising. The Index 
of Structural Reforms lacks an international com-
parison. It is normalized to range between the 
weakest and the best performance in the Latin 
American sample. But relative progress within 
the peer group may not be significant at the inter-
national level. Additionally, the impact of macro-
economic stability, an issue which figured pro-
minently in the Washington Consensus, is com-
pletely neglected. 
The Index of Economic Freedom constructed 
by the Heritage Foundation in cooperation with 
the Wall Street Journal allows for such an inter-
national comparison. Table A1 gives detailed 
results for the years 1995–2003 and a sample of 
countries consisting of the nine Latin American 
countries already included in Table 1 and a re-
ference group of fast-growing Asian countries 
including Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, India, and 
China. The Index of Economic Freedom largely 
covers the policy areas mentioned in the Wash-
ington Consensus. It has to be recognized, how-
ever, that there is a bias towards deregulation: 
less government intervention is always better. 
Hence, the Index of Economic Freedom does not 
fully represent the Washington Consensus as in-
tended by John Williamson but rather the Wash-
ington Consensus as perceived by IMF critiques 
and anti-globalizationers (Williamson 2003). 
Table A1 shows that the average assessment for 
all sample countries does not change over time. 
This result is strongly affected by the deteriorating 
assessments for the Asian crisis countries Korea, 
Malaysia, and Thailand. Not very different from 
Latin American crisis countries, these countries 
tried to stabilize their economies by reducing 
economic freedom. While this was a broad-based 
approach in the case of Thailand, Korea especial-
ly increased government interventions in the 
economy and Malaysia increased regulations of 
foreign direct investment, which is an important 
result. It shows that there is no strictly positive 
correlation between economic freedom and 
macroeconomic stability and that a temporary 
restriction of economic freedom may be part of a 
strategy to restabilize the economy if not to 
prevent a crisis. Another important result is that 
Asian countries do not perform better than the 
Latin American countries. Chile, for instance 
outperforms all Asian countries; it exhibits the 
highest level of economic freedom as well as the 
highest speed of reform. 
Table 2 adds macroeconomic development to 
this picture. It allows to compare indicators for 
the average macroeconomic performance of the 
sample countries with the indicators for the aver-
age performance with respect to structural re-
forms in the 1990s, i.e., the decade following the 
formulation of the Washington Consensus. The 
sample countries have been ordered according to 
real economic growth, and averages have been 
calculated for countries with an average growth 
below (above) 5 percent as well as for Latin 
American (Asian) countries. A first observation 
is that there are clear differences between slow-
growing and fast-growing countries with respect 
to macroeconomic performance. Fast-growing 
countries, i.e., the Asian reference group plus 
Chile and Costa Rica, are characterized by lower 
inflation rates, lower public deficits, lower cur-
rent account deficits, real devaluation instead 
of  real appreciation, more stable real exchange 
rates, higher savings and investment ratios, higher 
export growth, and higher openness. The fact that 
fast-growing countries have benefited on average 
from terms-of-trade adjustments is basically due 
to terms-of-trade gains for Chile. 
A second observation from Table 2 is that 
fast-growing countries do not differ from slowly 
growing countries when it comes to the indi-
cators of structural reform. The same holds when 
comparing the Latin American countries with the 
Asian reference group. The picture is a little 
bit different if one calculates an index for struc-
tural policies neglecting the area of “monetary 
policy,” which is only measured by the inflation 
rate. In this case, Latin American countries out-
perform the Asian reference group. 
All in all, there is no convincing correlation 
between structural reforms and economic 
growth, but a very strong correlation between 
macroeconomic performance and economic 
growth.  This  implies  that  macroeconomic  per- 7 
Table 2: 




























































  1990–2000 
South Africa  1.5   9.5   –4.8   –0.0   –2.5   3.2   17.5   14.7   4.6   –0.3   –1.1   42.7  
Brazil  2.1   767.3   –3.7   –2.0   –0.7   5.0   20.3   20.8   5.4   –0.1   –1.8   16.3  
Venezuela  2.5   34.1   –1.6   4.1   5.4   4.2   24.8   18.1   5.4   –12.9   –36.3   53.3  
Uruguay  2.9   44.9   –1.2   –1.2   4.9   2.4   15.4   15.0   6.2   7.8   22.9   74.1  
Peru  3.2   734.8   –1.5   –5.6   –1.9   5.6   17.7   20.9   7.7   –0.2   –0.9   29.7  
Mexico  3.7   19.4   0.0   –3.7   1.1   5.4   21.3   23.0   12.8   –0.5   –2.0   46.7 
Bolivia  3.9   9.9   –2.2   –5.9   –0.3   2.4   9.9   17.0   4.7   –4.1   –17.0   51.3  
Argentina  4.1   229.8   –1.0   –2.6   3.6   4.0   16.9   17.6   7.8   –0.1   –0.8   19.2  
Turkey  4.1   75.2   –7.0   –1.1   –1.3   3.9   20.1   24.2   9.5   –1.2   –5.5   49.0  
Costa Rica  5.1   16.3   –1.8   –3.5   0.7   1.7   16.5   19.4   10.9   2.3   5.5   87.0  
Thailand  5.2   4.7   –0.2   –1.8   –2.3   3.0   34.8   34.9   10.9   –2.7   –5.3   91.7  
India  5.5   9.0   –5.7   –1.3   –2.5   4.3   21.1   23.6   10.8   –1.4   –10.8   24.0  
Chile  6.4   11.0   1.3   –2.9   2.7   2.5   25.2   24.9   9.3   7.1   18.9   81.3  
South Korea  6.5   5.4   –0.3   0.7   –4.1   3.3   34.8   33.9   14.8   –2.9   –6.0   61.8  
Malaysia  7.3   3.5   0.8   –1.4   –1.8   2.8   40.8   35.0   13.7   3.8   4.2   184.2  
China  9.6   7.1   –1.8   1.8   –2.6   3.5   40.8   38.3   13.3   –0.6   –3.7   31.8  
                 
GDP <5.0  3.1   213.9   –2.6   –2.0   0.9   4.0   18.2   19.0   7.1   –1.3   –4.7   42.5  
GDP >5.0  6.5   8.2   –1.1   –1.2   –1.4   3.0   30.6   30.0   12.0   0.8   0.4   80.3  
                 
Asia  6.8   5.9   –1.4   –0.4   –2.7   3.4   34.5   33.1   12.7   –0.8   –4.3   78.7  
Latin America  3.6   177.5   –2.1   –2.2   1.1   3.7   18.7   19.6   7.7   –0.2   –1.6   50.1  
                 
  Index of Economic Freedomb 
























  1995–2000 
South Africa  2.9   4.5   4.0   2.3   3.0   2.0   3.0   2.0   3.0   2.0   3.2  2.9 
Brazil  3.4   4.2   3.4   2.8   5.0   3.0   3.0   2.7   3.0   3.3   3.5   3.2 
Venezuela  3.3   3.5   2.7   2.3   5.0   3.0   2.8   3.0   3.0   2.8   4.5   3.1 
Uruguay  2.7   2.3   3.4   2.0   4.8   2.0   2.2  2.0   2.3   3.0   2.8   2.5 
Peru  2.8   3.0   2.5   1.6  4.5   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.8   3.7   3.8   2.6 
Mexico  3.1   2.8   2.9   2.3  4.3   2.0   4.0   3.0   2.8   4.0   2.8   3.0 
Bolivia  2.8   2.0   3.2  2.8   3.2   2.0   2.3   1.0   2.8   4.0   3.8   2.7 
Argentina  2.4   3.7   2.5   2.0   3.5   2.0   2.2  2.0   2.0   2.0   2.2  2.3 
Turkey  2.8   1.8   3.6  1.8   5.0   2.0   2.0   3.0   2.0   2.7   3.2  2.5 
Costa Rica  2.9   3.8   3.0   2.4   4.0   2.0   3.0   2.0   3.0   3.0   2.8   2.8 
Thailand  2.4   3.0   2.2  1.7   2.2  2.5   3.0   3.0   1.5   3.0   2.0   2.4 
India  3.8   5.0   3.9   3.0   3.0   3.3   4.0   3.8   3.0   4.0   4.5   3.8 
Chile  2.3   2.7   2.9   1.1  3.2  2.0   3.0   2.3   1.0   2.0   2.3   2.2 
South Korea  2.3   2.8   2.8   1.8   2.3   2.5   2.3   2.0   1.0   3.0   2.0   2.3 
Malaysia  2.6   3.3  3.3   2.8   2.0   3.0   3.0   2.8   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.7 
China  3.6   5.0   2.5   4.0   3.0   3.0   3.0   3.0   4.0   4.0   3.7   3.6 
                 
GDP  <5.0  2.9  3.1  3.1 2.2 4.3 2.2 2.6 2.3 2.7 3.1 3.3  2.7 
GDP  >5.0  2.8  3.7  2.9 2.4 2.8 2.6 3.1 2.7 2.2 3.0 2.8  2.8 
                 
Asia  2.9   3.8   2.9   2.7   2.5   2.9  3.1  2.9   2.3   3.2   2.8   3.0 
Latin America  2.9   3.1   3.1   2.1   4.1   2.2   2.7  2.3  2.5   3.0  3.2   2.7 
aBased on standard deviations of the monthly real effective exchange rate data for each year. — bThe scale for each of the ten factors runs from 1 (best) to 5 
(worst). For determining the score, the factors are weighted equally. —cExcluding “monetary policy”. 
Source: World Bank (2003); JP Morgan (various issues); IMF (various issues); Heritage Foundation (various 
issues); own calculations. 
formance should be high on the reform agenda 
for emerging market economies (as claimed by 
proponents of the Washington Consensus) but 
that less government does not necessarily lead to 
higher growth (as claimed by the critiques of the 
Washington Consensus). A comprehensive re-8 
form agenda has to define a positive set of gov-
ernment interventions, which will be discussed in 
more detail in Section 2.2. It also remains open 
to debate which exchange rate and capital market 
policies are adequate to achieve macroeconomic 
stability as well as high domestic savings, invest-
ment and export growth, which characterize fast-
growing countries. 
2.2  Exchange Rate Policy and Export 
Growth 
While the need for macroeconomic stability is 
generally acknowleged, there is no consensus 
with respect to the exchange rate policies which 
support this priority. After the financial crises of 
the last decade, there has been an increasing 
trend towards flexible exchange rates. Neverthe-
less, there are considerable doubts about whether 
fully flexible exchange rates consitute a plausible 
exchange rate regime for emerging market econ-
omies. These doubts arise because the recent 
crises have not only pointed to the risks involved 
in fixed exchange rate regimes not embedded in 
a consistent reform package, but also to the 
importance of exchange rate developments for 
small open economies. This explains why active 
exchange rate policy has been used in Asia and 
Latin America, albeit for different reasons 
(Schweickert 2000a). 
Exchange rate policy in rapidly growing Asian 
countries has traditionally focused on external 
rather than internal equilibrium. The idea was to 
support export expansion by a stable relative 
price for tradable goods (Corden 1996; Fischer 
1997). This strategy is in line with the Washing-
ton Consensus which argued in favor of com-
petitive exchange rates. From a macroeconomic 
perspective, the key variable which drives the 
allocation of resources is the real exchange rate, 
i.e., the relative price of tradable to nontradable 
goods. A comparison of the development of the 
real exchange rate in Asian and Latin American 
countries reveals two important stylized facts. 
First, empirical evidence shows that export 
growth in fast-growing Asian countries was sup-
ported by stable real exchange rates and the 
avoidance of real appreciation. Several reasons 
can be put forward to explain why high pro-
ductivity growth has not, as assumed by the 
Balassa–Samuelson hypothesis, increased wages 
and the inflation rate: high foreign exchange re-
serve ratios, strong labor supply, and strong com-
petition also for nontraded goods (Schweickert 
2000b). 
Second, exports of Asian countries show a 
positive reaction to real devaluation, and the cur-
rent account is driven by the development of 
exports rather than imports as is the case for 
Latin American countries. Hence, exchange rate 
management has also been facilitated by flexible 
and demand-responsive exports. As shown in 
Figure 1, the strong devaluations after the debt 
crisis of the 1980s and the financial crisis of the 
1990s initiated an export boom which allowed 
these countries to regain macroeconomic stabil-
ity rather fast. It has been almost forgotten that, 
in the 1980s, the debt problems of Korea and the 
public sector imbalances in Malaysia where at 
least as severe as the problems of Latin Ameri-
can countries at that time. 
In contrast to Asia, the exchange rate in Latin 
America was mainly used as a nominal anchor 
(Diehl and Schweickert 1997). Given the high 
degree of dollarization and de facto indexation of 
domestic inflation, fixing the exchange rate was 
a plausible disinflation strategy (Schweickert 
1996). As a result, Figure 1 shows that the in-
flation rates in the Latin American sample coun-
tries converged towards Asian levels during the 
1980s. It is remarkable that even after the more 
recent crises and the floating of exchange rates 
inflation remained under control. The flip side of 
the coin is that exchange rate policy was not ad-
equate to foster export performance. It is evident 
from Table 2 that only Mexico, Costa Rica, and 
Chile were able to reach export growth com-
parable to Asian standards. This was due to an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, which was 
also less stable than in Asian countries. 
After disinflation has largely been achieved, 
monetary policy in Latin America can now be re-
adjusted in an environment with flexible exchange 
rates. Among the monetary strategies currently 
debated, inflation targeting and de jure flexible 
exchange rates figure prominently (Schaechter 
et al. 2000). The proponents of inflation targeting  9 
Figure 1: 
Macroeconomic Stability in Latin America and Asia, 1985–2001 
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aOn the basis of the real effective exchange rate from JP Morgan except for Bolivia, China, Costa Rica, and Uruguay (IMF). 
Source: World Bank (2003); JP Morgan (various issues); IMF (various issues); own calculations. 
claim that this strategy, which was developed for 
industrialized countries giving high priority to 
controlling inflation (see, e.g. Bernanke et al. 
1999), can be adopted in an emerging market 10 
environment as well (see, e.g. Loayza and Soto 
2002). However, inflation targeting faces, at 
least, two difficulties when adopted by emerging 
market economies (Mishkin 2000). The first pro-
blem is that the transmission mechanism is much 
more unstable in emerging market economies, 
which reduces the effectiveness of targeting the 
inflation rate considerably. The second problem 
are balance-sheet effects. Because assets as well 
as liabilities of Latin American countries are 
largely dollarized, devaluations may cause finan-
cial crises (Aghion et al. 2001; Céspedes et al. 
2000). Emerging markets and especially Latin 
American countries can therefore hardly ignore 
exchange rate developments completely 
(Williamson 2000; Braga de Macedo et al. 
2001; Goldstein 2002). 
Empirical studies reveal that the risk of higher 
debt service due to unforeseen devaluations in-
deed increases risk premia for emerging market 
economies (Berganza et al. 2003) and that de 
jure and de facto exchange rate regimes differ 
considerably, with de facto regimes showing a 
higher degree of exchange rate intervention by 
central banks (Calvo and Reinhart 2002; Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2002). Additionally, the 
reaction functions of central banks show that 
interest rates react to exchange rate movements 
(Monetary Policy 2003) or that, as was the case 
in Chile, interventions in the foreign exchange 
market have been used as a parachute in order to 
safeguard external equilibrium in cases of global 
financial crises (Hammermann 2003). 
It can be argued, however, that, independent 
of the type of intermediate exchange rate regime 
chosen by Latin American countries, macroeco-
nomic management will still suffer from a weak 
and inflexible export base. This constrains the 
potential to support an exchange rate target as 
well as the potential to reduce the debt burden. 
Additionally, while real devaluation tends to be 
expansionary in Asia because the increasing 
prices for tradable final goods support the export 
sector, real devaluation tends to be contraction-
ary in Latin American countries because in-
creasing prices for tradable inputs hamper the 
export sector. As can bee seen in Figure 1, large 
devaluations in Latin American countries do not 
lead to export booms; before export growth gains 
momentum the next phase of real appreciation 
hampers competitiveness again. 
Thus, the development of a strong export base 
seems to be more promising for solving Latin 
America’s macroeconomic stability problems 
than fine-tuning exchange rate systems. Latin 
America urgently needs a higher degree of ex-
port diversification and a higher share of manu-
factured exports (Rojas-Suarez 2003). The Asian 
example demonstrates that an export-oriented 
policy increased productivity growth and enabled 
Asian countries to reap the potential gains from 
globalization (Nunnenkamp 2003; Pack 1997). 
Contrary to Latin America, the development of 
export sectors created demand for the labor sup-
plied by smallholders and urban informals, 
which are the poorest households in developing 
countries, thereby increasing productivity and 
reducing poverty. Additionally, Asian export 
sectors are characterized by the dominance of 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
which adopt advanced technologies for labor-
intensive production. 
This outcome can be explained by a bundle of 
preconditions and policies which together con-
stituted a critical mass for the dynamic develop-
ment of exports. Among the preconditions for the 
export flexibility of Asian countries were a rela-
tively even income distribution which facilitated 
credit access and the foundation of SMEs, a high 
level of human capital which especially led to 
high competence in natural science and technol-
ogy, and a nondiscrimination of exports. This 
allowed Asian companies to adopt new tech-
nologies and to respond to relative price adjust-
ments. The bad news for Latin America is that 
the preconditions for improving the export base 
are either not given or difficult to create in the 
short run. The good news is that with increasing 
macroeconomic stability dynamic processes may 
not be interrupted as in the past. In this case, in-
creasing exports could lead to learning-by-doing 
and, thereby, to a self-enforcing dynamic devel-
opment. Such a process has to be started. 
In recent years, Latin American countries have 
tried to increase the platform for such a devel-
opment beyond national borders. New regional 
integration strategies have not aimed at discrimi-
nation but at maximizing market entry (Dieter 11 
2003). These initiatives have gone into the right 
direction because they increase the potential for 
competition and learning-by-doing. However, 
there is the danger that global integration is 
undermined by an ever-increasing number of re-
gional integration schemes (Wei and Frankel 
1998; Busse et al. 2000), resulting in the so-
called “spaghetti bowl phenomenon” (Bhagwati 
1998). Additionally, being successful in con-
cluding ever more regional agreements could 
weaken the awareness of domestic shortcomings 
with respect to macroeconomic stability, tech-
nology policy, capital market access, enterpre-
neurial culture, and human capital development. 
To a large extent, manufactured products from 
Latin America are still not competitive (Nunnen-
kamp 2001). 
Even less promising are current attempts to 
foster monetary integration. These attempts are 
inspired by the example of EU accession coun-
tries which have a perspective to enter European 
Monetary Union (EMU) in a few years 
(Schweickert 2001). Empirical studies show that 
there are indeed positive effects of monetary in-
tegration for trade (Vinhas de Souza 2002) and 
labor markets (Belke and Setzer 2003), which are 
of relevance for emerging market economies, 
e.g. for the MERCOSUR (Belke and Gros 2002). 
The preconditions for the realization of monetary 
integration are, however, considerably worse 
than in Europe (Schweickert 2002). In Southeast 
Asia, countries are still struggling with using the 
large foreign exchange reserves of the region 
more efficiently (Dieter 2003), but attempts to 
adopt a common monetary policy or even a com-
mon currency are as unrealistic as for Latin 
American countries (Berg et al. 2003; 
Schweickert 2000c). It seems to be more pro-
mising to supplement flexible exchange rate re-
gimes by regional monitoring as argued by 
Williamson (2000). In the medium run, this 
could help increase peer pressure and formulate 
common positions with respect to good macro-
economic management (Braga de Macedo et al. 
2001). 
2.3  Capital Market Policy, Savings, and 
Investment 
The differences between Latin American and 
Asian countries are even more pronounced with 
respect to savings and investment ratios. Savings 
and investment ratios between the two groups of 
countries differ on average by more than 15 per-
centage points (Table 2). Even Chile’s savings 
ratio, with 25 percent of GDP the highest in 
Latin America during the 1990s, was still con-
siderably lower than Thailand’s and Korea’s 
(about 35 percent of GDP) or even Malaysia’s 
and China’s (about 40 percent of GDP). It is, 
therefore, rather surprising that the public debate 
concentrates on the stability of external savings, 
i.e., capital flows, and on the rather moderate 
progress of reforms of the international financial 
architecture, e.g., the lack of institutionalized in-
solvency procedures (Griffith-Jones and Ocampo 
2003). 
The Washington Consensus does not include 
explicit views on capital controls. This demon-
strates that there was no consensus about 
whether and, if yes, when capital flows are to be 
liberalized. However, the debate about the 
reasons for the Asian currency crisis led even the 
proponents of open markets to a more sceptical 
view about free capital movements, leading to a 
far-reaching consensus that trade liberalization 
and the reform of the domestic capital market has 
to precede the complete opening up towards 
external capital (Nsouli et al. 2002; Collier and 
Gunning 1999). Only few authors (e.g. Lal 1987) 
claim that an early liberalization of capital flows 
increases the speed of reform by increasing 
competition on the basis of world market prices. 
The majority view, which, however, is not 
shared by the US government, can be sum-
marized in two points. First, capital controls are 
more effective in the short than in the long run. 
They are also more effective with respect to in-
flows than to outflows and when targeted at 
specific sectors rather than at the whole economy 
(Kenen 1996). This implies that it should be 
easiest to implement controls on short-term in-
flows into the financial sector provided that an 
efficient regulation of the financial sector is in 
place. Such a regulation, which is explicitly re-12 
commended in the Washington Consensus, re-
quires, to a considerable extent, capital controls, 
e.g. in the form of limitations to currency risks. 
Second, capital controls like the taxation of 
inflows with short maturities are a legitimate 
instrument of macroeconomic risk management 
in order to prevent or to overcome financial 
crises (Rogoff 2002; Bhagwati and Tarullo 2003; 
Williamson 2003). It was after the Asian crisis 
that the awareness of the risks involved in capital 
inflows due to globalization effects increased. 
This is surprising given the fact that the lessons 
should already have been learned in the early 
1980s when Latin American countries, especially 
Chile, experienced a turnaround in capital flows, 
which led to deep recessions. The higher capital 
inflows, the higher the risk of reversals and the 
more likely it becomes that bad news fuel self-
fulfilling expectations about a financial crisis 
(Schweickert 2000b). Consequently, capital mar-
ket policies have moved towards encouraging 
foreign direct investment (FDI), which is the 
most stable type of capital flow, and towards the 
view that further opening up of the capital ac-
count should be conditional on the development 
of domestic capital markets. Emprical studies on 
the effectiveness of capital controls show mixed 
results but they indicate that it is at least possible 
to influence the structure of capital inflows 
(Cárdenas and Barrera 1997). However, without 
the liberalization of FDI and a stable macro-
economic framework, as was the case in Chile, 
capital controls do not make any sense because 
they will not have any predictable effects on the 
structure of capital inflows (Williamson 2000). 
Given the scepticism about FDI in the past, the 
recent optimism is quite astonishing. That FDI is 
assumed to be stable and favorable for economic 
growth is hardly debated at all. But this is not 
self-evident: 
• The possibilities to influence the amount of 
FDI inflows in the short run are limited be-
cause this type of capital inflow is driven by 
supply rather than by demand. The fact that 
FDI is more stable than other types of capital 
inflows also means that it is less flexible. 
•  To the extent that FDI has to be attracted in 
order to finance a savings gap, its function as a 
means of technology transfer is not given first 
priority, implying negative consequences for 
its growth impact. 
•  Inflows of FDI can lead to governance pro-
blems. This is more likely when single pro-
jects are relatively large, the host country rela-
tively small, and it’s administrative capacity 
rather limited. 
•  The growth impact is also diminished when 
FDI, e.g. in the primary sector, has no spill-
over effects because of the lack of com-
plementary factors like human capital. 
Hence, the reasons why the preconditions for 
positive effects of FDI are worse in Latin 
America than in Asia are similar to those men-
tioned above in the case of export dynamics: the 
prime motivation for attracting FDI is to generate 
capital inflows rather than technology inflows 
and there is no tradition of SMEs equipped with 
sufficient human capital to implement new tech-
nology in an efficient search process. 
This corresponds to the evidence that, in con-
trast to trade, Latin America is not lagging be-
hind Asia in drawing on FDI (Nunenkamp 2003; 
UNCTAD 2003). Both regions host a similar 
share of global FDI stocks. In recent years, the 
contribution of FDI inflows to overall capital 
formation was much higher in Latin America (19 
percent in 1997–2002) than in Asia (11 percent). 
Nevertheless, the correlation between FDI and 
growth of per capita income is loose at best for 
the region (Nunnenkamp 2003). The absence of 
significantly positive growth effects of FDI may 
be due to several factors: 
•  In various Latin American host countries, no-
tably in Brazil, FDI traditionally was oriented 
towards local markets and concentrated in 
capital- and technology-intensive manufactur-
ing industries in which host countries lacked 
international competitiveness. Nunnenkamp 
and Spatz (2003) show that the growth effects 
of such market-seeking FDI tend to be smaller 
than the growth effects of efficiency-seeking 
FDI. 
•  Foreign investors operating in protected Latin 
American markets often had to meet local con-
tent requirements. In other words, the degree of 
competition through imports was limited for 13 
both foreign investors and local input suppliers. 
The lack of competition had a markedly nega-
tive impact on the hosts’ prospects for devel-
opment (Moran 1999).  
• Survey results also indicate that FDI brings 
somewhat less new technology to Latin 
America than to Asia (World Economic Forum 
2003). Productivity-enhancing spillovers of 
FDI to local enterprises are constrained further 
by an insufficient endowment of Latin Ameri-
can host countries with complementary factors 
of production. The literature suggests that the 
extent to which local enterprises benefit from 
spillovers has an important impact on the eco-
nomic growth effects of FDI (Kokko 2002). 
•  Finally, FDI has crowded out domestic invest-
ment in Latin America, whereas FDI induced 
additional domestic investment in Asia (Agosin 
and Mayer 2000). 
As in the case of trade, new regional initiatives 
are unlikely to change that picture significantly. 
Large scale increases of the market size can only 
be realized in North-South integration schemes. 
Additionally, the advantages of globalization or 
regional integration can only be reaped if 
domestic reforms allow for spillover effects in 
a competitive environment. 
Given the low level of savings in Latin 
America, it is also clear that capital inflows are 
insufficient to finance an investment ratio needed 
to start a catching-up process without generating 
unsustainable external imbalances. Only a sub-
stantial increase in domestic savings would re-
duce the dependence on external savings and the 
corresponding instabilities and risks. The Wash-
ington Consensus demands positive real interest 
rates and excludes the financial sector from the 
list of deregulation policies. However, in the 
meantime most Latin American countries have 
realized positive real interest rates over a long 
period without experiencing a significant in-
crease in the savings ratio (Schweickert 2003b). 
Empirical studies on the question of why 
savings are so low in Latin America support the 
following correlations:  
•  The level of real per capita income positively 
affects savings rates. The influence of income 
is typically larger in developing than in in-
dustrial countries. In developing countries a 
doubling of income per capita is estimated to 
raise the long-run private savings rate by 10 
percentage points. The distribution of income 
has no clear-cut influence on savings. Income 
concentration has a positive effect on house-
hold savings but a negative effect on corporate 
and public savings, resulting in an ambiguous 
effect on aggregate savings (Loayza et al. 
2000; Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén 2000). 
•  Public sector savings seems to be one of the 
most direct and effective tools available to in-
crease national savings as they only partially 
crowd out private savings. The crowding-out 
effect, however, differs widely between re-
gions and is especially high for Latin Ameri-
can countries (Burnside 1998). Regarding the 
composition of public savings, the inter-
national evidence shows that cutting expen-
ditures is a more effective way to increase 
national savings than raising taxes (Corbo and 
Schmidt-Hebbel 1991; Edwards 1996). 
•  Empirical evidence shows that countries that 
increase the funding of their mandatory retire-
ment programs tend to achieve higher private 
savings rates. Evidence for Chile, the first 
emerging market country that reformed its 
pension system, suggests that one-third of the 
12 percentage point increase in the national 
savings rate since the mid-1980s can be 
attributed to the pension reform (Schmidt-
Hebbel 1999). Negative effects of pay-as-you-
go systems increase with the systems’s cover-
age rate (Samwick 2000). 
•  Positive effects of financial liberalization are 
only indirect if liberalization improves the ef-
ficiency of financial intermediation and hence 
investment, contributing to higher growth. 
Thus it is only through faster growth that 
financial liberalization will increase private 
saving rates. 
• Increases in external savings in most cases 
lead to lower overall savings (Loayza et al. 
2000).  
All in all, empirical studies come to the con-
clusion that economic growth is the single most 
important determinant of savings (Edwards 
1995). The example of countries which ex-14 
perienced surges in both economic growth and 
savings demonstrates that higher growth leads to 
higher savings which, in turn, makes the surge 
in  growth sustainable. On the contrary, initial 
surges in savings do not lead to sustained surges 
in economic growth (Rodrik 2000). Arguably, 
productivity shocks increase profits and induce 
higher investment and growth. Because consump-
tion habits are rather stable, this leads to higher 
savings and further investment and growth. Look-
ing at the country results, economic policies 
played a different role. In Asian countries like 
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan the virtuous cycle 
has been initiated by investment and export in-
centives as well as by complementary public 
investment. In contrast, increases in growth and 
savings in Chile have been supported mainly by 
the reform of the pension system. This implies 
that higher savings ratios in Asia than in Latin 
America do not reflect differences in preferences 
but better investment perspectives. A calculation 
of hypothetical Asian savings ratios under the 
assumption of Latin American growth rates even 
shows that potential savings are lower in Asia 
than in Latin America (Gavin et al. 1997). 
Hence, incentives for investment seem to be 
more important than incentives for savings. As 
was the case for exports, the problem is to start a 
dynamic process. Additionally, there are direct 
links between export performance and savings. 
First, export sectors exhibit higher-than-average 
savings ratios. This holds especially for exports 
of the primary sector. Second, exports are a 
reliable tax base. Hence, increasing exports im-
proves the prospects for public savings consider-
ably. Finally, trade allows to make use of com-
parative advantages, which leads to higher 
growth and, thus, indirectly also to higher 
savings (Reichel 1993, 1996). As argued above, 
the structural and institutional preconditions for 
improving export and investment conditions are 
poor in Latin America compared to fast-growing 
Asia. Because of a highly unequal income 
distribution and deficiencies in human capital 
formation poor individuals in Latin America lack 
social mobility and the incentives to invest. 
Furthermore, access to formal credit is limited 
for the poor, which implies that economic devel-
opment takes place only in a small sector of the 
economy and that small and medium-sized enter-
prises are difficult to establish. 
All in all, the discussion of exchange rate and 
capital market policies showed that the Wash-
ington Consensus is not a sufficient agenda for 
sustainable growth. A widening of the reform 
agenda is justified because even those Latin 
American countries which implemented the 
Washington Consensus are far from experiencing 
a dynamic economic development like the fast-
growing Asian countries. 
As outlined by Kuczynski and Williamson 
(2003), a comprehensive reform agenda has to 
define new targets and policies which are to be 
discussed next. At the same time, the vulnerability 
of Latin American countries has to be reduced so 
that positive effects of reforms can develop at all. 
In order to reduce vulnerability, Kuczynski and 
Williamson argue in favor of an anti-cyclical fis-
cal policy and regional monitoring “…analogous 
(though helpfully more sophisticated than) the 
European Growth and Stability Pact…” (William-
son 2003: 12) which should supplement more 
flexible exchange rates and efforts to increase 
domestic savings. However, attempts to imple-
ment European-type monitoring and anti-cyclical 
fiscal policy in Latin America seem too ambitious. 
With respect to fiscal policy, Calderón and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2003) show that only credible 
governments were able to allow for automatic 
stabilizers. Hence, the reduction of vulnerability 
would be the precondition for an anti-cyclical 
policy. Therefore, this report emphasizes the role 
of exports and, more generally, of technological 








3 Sufficient  Conditions:  The  Quest  for a Post-Washington Consensus 
When he was still chief economist at the World 
Bank, Joseph Stiglitz coined the term “Post-
Washington Consensus” in an article with the 
programmatic title “More Instruments and 
Broader Goals: Moving toward the Post-Wash-
ington Consensus” (Stiglitz 1998). Arguably, not 
all the changes demanded in this article will 
command a consensus. In particular, the as-
sertion that macroeconomic stabilization should 
not be too ambitious and that inflation rates of up 
to 40 percent might be tolerable is likely to re-
main a minority view (see the discussion in Sec-
tion 2.1.1). In two areas mentioned by Stiglitz, a 
broad consensus is emerging, however. First, it is 
increasingly acknowledged that, in addition to 
economic growth, poverty and the distribution of 
income and wealth have to be considered ex-
plicitly, with a strong emphasis put on human 
capital formation through mobilizing the poten-
tial of the poor. Second, there is mounting evi-
dence that sustained growth is only possible if a 
reliable institutional framework is in place. Dif-
ferences in these two areas are important deter-
minants of the diverging developments in Latin 
America and Asia. 
3.1  Poverty Alleviation and 
Redistribution 
The absence of poverty considerations in the 
Washington Consensus is partly due to the spe-
cial problems facing most Latin American 
economies in the 1980s, but it also reflects the 
view prevailing at that time that growth is the 
single-most important means of poverty allevia-
tion, rendering a separate poverty reduction 
strategy unnecessary. Income distribution objec-
tives were left out of the Washington Consensus 
because there was assumed to exist an almost in-
evitable trade-off between economic growth and 
an egalitarian income distribution. In addition, 
only the reduction of absolute poverty, as op-
posed to relative poverty, was accepted as a 
legitimate goal of development policy. 
Empirical evidence indeed reveals a strongly 
positive correlation between sustained growth 
and poverty reduction. A much-cited World 
Bank study, for example, estimates for a broad 
cross-section of countries that on average poor 
and rich population groups benefit roughly 
equally from economic growth (Dollar and 
Kraay 2001). Available data on the evolution of 
absolute poverty in Asia and Latin America also 
show that growth is a necessary condition for 
successful poverty alleviation. Only the high-
performing Asian economies and Chile have 
achieved dramatic improvements in the living 
standards of the poor during the 1990s, while 
poverty has proven to be highly persistent, on 
average, in the Latin American countries with 
low or moderate growth (see Table 3). At the 
lowest end of the scale, Venezuela’s economic 
stagnation was even associated with a consider-
able rise in the poverty headcount. 
In spite of this evidence, growth alone is un-
likely to be sufficient for effective poverty al-
leviation. This is particularly so if one tries to 
pursue a pro-poor growth strategy, where the 
poor are to benefit disproportionately from 
higher average incomes (Klasen 2003; Nunnen-
kamp and Thiele 2004). It has been shown that 
those among the poor who lack access to pro-
ductive assets (human capital, physical capital, 
land, networks) hardly benefit from increases in 
average living standards based on growth (e.g. 
Christiaensen et al. 2002). As a result of extreme 
economic inequality and social exclusion, this 
group tends to be fairly large in Latin America, 
which is even true for wealthier countries such as 
Brazil. This is, for instance, reflected in the fact 
that none of the larger Latin American countries 
has been able to reduce employment in the urban 
informal sector, where earnings tend to be low 
and stagnating (Saavedra 2003). 
Beside the lack of resources controlled by the 
poor, labor market regulations, which have hard-
ly been dismantled over the 1990s, have con-
tributed to the persistently large informal sectors 
in Latin America. Specifically, nonwage labor 
costs and severance payments are much higher in 
Latin America than in Asia (Djankov et al. 
2003).  Both  factors  have  forced  low-skilled  16 
Table 3: 
Poverty and Income Distribution in Latin America and Asia, 1989–2000 
 Poverty  ratea Gini  coefficientb 
  first year  last year  first year  last year 
Argentina 18.4  17.9  0.47  0.49 
Bolivia 65.6  61.4  0.54  0.60 
Brazil 48.3  41.3  0.57  0.58 
Chile 32.4  16.1  0.55  0.56 
Colombia 42.4  39.4  0.57  0.56 
Costa Rica  35.9  30.5  0.46  0.46 
Ecuador 49.5  48.0  0.56  0.56 
Mexico 19.7  21.2  0.53  0.54 
Paraguay 52.1  51.0  0.57  0.57 
Peru 41.9  42.4  0.46  0.49 
Uruguay 23.1  13.6  0.41  0.44 
Venezuela 12.6  20.6  0.43  0.47 
Average —c — c 0.51  0.53 
China   31.5  17.4  0.36  0.40 
India 40.9  28.6  0.31  0.36 
Korea n.a.  n.a.  0.34  0.32 
Malaysia  17.1 9.6 0.41  0.42 
Thailand  21.1 8.6 0.47  0.41 
Average —c — c 0.38  0.38 
aShare of the population with income below the poverty line. — bMost common summary indicator of income distribution; 
lies between 0 (perfect equality) and 1 (perfect inequality); coefficients of about 0.5 and more indicate high inequality. — 
cAverages were not calculated because the figures are based on national poverty lines and are therefore not comparable 
across countries. 
Source: Behrman et al. (2001); Chen and Wang (2002); Warr (2002); World Bank (2003). 
workers either to stay in the unprotected informal 
sector or to become unemployed (IADB 2003). 
In some Latin American countries (e.g. Brazil 
and Colombia), this effect seems to have been 
reinforced by high minimum wages. 
The assertion that there is an almost inevitable 
trade-off between economic growth and an 
egalitarian distribution of income or wealth is 
increasingly called into question. Rather, recent 
research argues that severe disparities may hin-
der the growth process, via two main channels 
(e.g. Bénabou 1996): first, highly polarized so-
cieties are likely to experience political instabil-
ity, e.g. in the form of violent protests against the 
privileges of ruling elites. This hampers invest-
ment and thereby lowers growth (see Section 
2.2.3). Second, high inequality implies that a 
high proportion of the population lacks the 
means to undertake profitable investments, be-
cause liquidity is low and at the same time access 
to capital markets is constrained. This is particu-
larly obvious in the area of human capital forma-
tion, where expected future earnings cannot be 
used as collateral, but it is also true for small-
holders and micro entrepreneurs, whose access to 
credit is frequently limited by a lack of secure 
land and property rights (De Soto 2000). Case 
studies for China and Peru suggest that land and 
property titles tend to improve credit availability 
and that, on average, the beneficiaries of titling 
programs are enabled to increase investment 
(Deininger and Jin 2003; Larson et al. 2003). 
Together with some Southern African states, 
Latin America as a region exhibits the most un-
equal distribution of income and assets world-
wide. The Gini coefficient, the most common 
summary measure of income distribution, is 
slightly above 0.5 on average, which is consid-
erably higher than the average of below 0.4 for 
the fast-growing Asian economies (Table 3). 
This aggregate pattern has barely changed over 
time. On the country level it turns out that even 
Uruguay, the most egalitarian economy in Latin 
America, falls short of the Asian average. During 
the 1990s, no Latin American country experi-
enced improvements in the distribution of in-17 
come; in countries like Bolivia and Venezuela 
the distribution even deteriorated. The picture for 
Asia varies with income levels: while the catch-
ing-up process in the relatively poor countries—
China and India—has been accompanied by in-
creasing disparities, disparities in Korea and 
Thailand decreased over the 1990s. 
In terms of asset inequality, differences be-
tween Latin America and Asia are even more 
pronounced than in terms of income inequality. 
Despite recent efforts in some Latin American 
countries (e.g. Colombia and Brazil) to initiate 
market-oriented land reforms (Birdsall et al. 
2001), the region’s land distribution remains 
particularly skewed, but access to education—
approximated by school enrollment—is also sig-
nificantly more unequal than in Asia (Birdsall 
and Londoño 1997). The latter is reflected in the 
structure of public education expenditures, which 
tend to favor basic education in Asia and uni-
versity education in Latin America. South Korea, 
for instance, allocated only 12 percent of the 
1998 education budget to tertiary education, 
while the average share for Latin America was 
22 percent (Wolff and de Moura Castro 2003). 
Due to a private contribution to overall uni-
versity financing of more than 80 percent, South 
Korea’s total expenditures per student neverthe-
less exceeded those of all Latin American coun-
tries apart from Brazil. 
Empirical studies show that the unequal distri-
bution of land and human capital has impaired 
economic development in Latin America (e.g. 
Birdsall and Londoño 1997), while an early 
focus on basic education and equal access to land 
have been crucial for the sustained and broad-
based growth of East Asia’s most successful re-
formers, South Korea and Taiwan (Rodrik 1994). 
Cross-country studies also detect a strongly 
positive relationship between an equal distribu-
tion of wealth and subsequent growth (Deininger 
and Olinto 2000). Evidence with respect to in-
come distribution is less robust: while the corre-
lation between equality and growth seems to be 
weakly positive for developing countries (Barro 
2000), the reverse result obtains when indus-
trialized countries are additionally included in 
the sample (Forbes 2000). 
All in all, differences in the distribution of 
assets stand out as a determinant of diverging 
developments in Latin America and Asia. By re-
stricting access to credit and investment oppor-
tunities, the lack of assets for broad segments of 
the population puts Latin America at a disad-
vantage in terms of both growth and poverty 
alleviation. 
3.2  Human Capital Formation 
The role of human capital formation is not con-
fined to augmenting individual earning capaci-
ties; it is also expected to matter for aggregate 
economic growth. The relationship between 
human capital formation and economic growth 
has been investigated in a large number of cross-
country studies. Many of these studies confirm 
the hypothesis of a positive impact (e.g. Mankiw 
et al. 1992; Dollar and Kraay 2001), but there is 
also an increasing number of investigations 
which cannot detect a significant relationship 
between the two variables (e.g. Pritchett 2001). 
This ambiguity can to a large extent be explained 
by the fact that human capital formation is usu-
ally approximated by the years of schooling, an 
indicator of the quantity of education, and thus 
neglects quality differences. Recent empirical re-
search has demonstrated the decisive importance 
of educational quality for economic growth (e.g. 
Hanushek and Kimko 2000). Educational quality 
is also the key factor determining the poverty 
impact of human capital formation. Gundlach et 
al. (2001) show in a cross-country study that in-
vestment in human capital favors the poor dis-
proportionately if quality aspects are taken into 
account. 
A comparison between Latin America and 
Asia reveals no systematic differences in quan-
tity terms (Table 4). Access to primary schooling 
appears to be almost universal in both regions. 
The somewhat higher enrollment figures for 
Latin America do not indicate superior access to 
primary education; rather, they reflect the fact 
that in Latin America more primary school at-
tendants than in Asia are above the standard 
primary school age (see footnote in Table 4). At  
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Table 4: 
School Enrollment in Latin America and Asia, 1990 and 2000a 
Primary Secondary Tertiary   
1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 
Argentina    106    120   71   97   39   48 
Bolivia   95    116   36   79   21   36 
Brazil    106    125   38   88   11   17 
Chile    100    103   73   75   21   37 
Colombia    102    112   50   70   13   23 
Costa  Rica    101    107   42   60   27   16 
Ecuador    116    115   55   57   20   18 
Mexico    114    113   53   75   15   21 
Paraguay    105    111   31   60    8   10 
Peru    118    127   67   81   30   29 
Uruguay    108    109   81   98   29   36 
Venezuela   95    102   35   59   29   28 
Average    106    113   53   75   22   27 
China   125  106   49   63   3   8 
India   97    102   44   49    6   10 
Korea    105    101   90   94   39   78 
Malaysia   94   99   56   70    7   28 
Thailand   99   95   30   82   17   35 
Average    104    101   54   72   14   32 
aEnrollment rates are calculated as the ratio between the number of students enrolled and the number of children having the 
standard school age. In primary education, enrollment rates can take on values of above 100 when some of the pupils are 
older than the country’s standard primary school age. 
Source: World Bank (2003). 
the secondary level, almost all countries made 
considerable progress during the 1990s. Most 
notably, Brazil and Thailand could increase en-
rollment from 38 to 88 percent and from 30 to 82 
percent, respectively. With an almost universal 
access to secondary education, Argentina and 
Uruguay are now even up with South Korea. 
Only a few Latin American countries (e.g. 
Ecuador and Venezuela) as well as China and 
especially India are still lagging behind. Tertiary 
enrollment exhibits the largest variance across 
countries, but there is no discernible regional 
pattern. 
Substantial quality differences between the 
two regions persist, however. There are indi-
cations that, unlike Asia, Latin America has paid 
for broader access to education in terms of lower 
quality. A number of symptoms can be found for 
Latin America’s quality problems: first, the in-
crease in the number of pupils has not been 
matched by increasing expenditures for learning 
materials and teachers, i.e., the endowments 
available per pupil have fallen. It has to be taken 
into account, however, that additional expendi-
tures probably only have the intended effect on 
educational quality if they are backed up by 
institutional reforms such as stronger school 
autonomy or the formulation of educational stan-
dards in combination with regular evaluations, 
which provide appropriate incentives for all ac-
tors participating in the schooling system 
(Wößmann 2002). Second, the successes in terms 
of improved access to education have to be quali-
fied because of high drop-out rates. In Bolivia 
and Colombia, for example, only three quarters 
of the children entering primary schools finished 
the 6th grade in 1999; in Brazil, the share was 
only 70 percent (Wolff and de Moura Castro 
2003). 
Finally, the few Latin American participants in 
the recent international rankings of school per-
formance (TIMSS, TIMSS Repeat, and PISA) 
have all done badly (Table 5). Mexico and Brazil 
come last in all three categories (reading, mathe-
matics, and science) of PISA, behind countries 
with lower per capita income such as Poland and  19 
Table 5: 
Ranking of Selected Countries in International Educational Achievement Studies 
PISAa 
Reading  Mathematics  Science 
Country  Position  Score  Country  Position  Score  Country  Position  Score 
Finland   1  546  Japan   1  557  South Korea   1  552 
Canada   2  534  South Korea   2  547  Japan   2  550 
Australia  4  528  Australia  5  533  UK   4  532 
South Korea   6  525  Canada   6  533  Canada   5  529 
UK   7  523  UK   8  529  Australia  7  528 
Japan    8  522 France    10  517 France    12  500 
France   14  505  USA   19  493  USA   14  499 
USA   15  504  Germany   20  490  Germany   20  487 
Italy   20  487  Russia   22  478  Poland   21  483 
Germany   21  484  Poland   24  470  Italy   23  478 
Poland   24  479  Italy   26  457  Russia   26  460 
Russia   27  462  Mexico   30  387  Mexico   30  422 
Mexico   30  422  Brazil   31  334  Brazil   31  375 
Brazil   31  396               
TIMSSb TIMSS  Repeatc 
Mathematics Science Mathematics Science 
Country  Position Score Country  Position Score Country Position  Score  Country Position  Score 
Singapore  1 643  Singapore  1 607  Singapore  1  604  Taiwan  1 569 
South Korea  2 607  Japan  3 571  South Korea  2 587  Japan  4  550 
Japan 3  605  South Korea  4 565  Japan  5  5,579  South Korea  5 549 
France  13 538  England  10 552  Canada  10  531  Australia  7 540 
Russia  15 535  Australia  12 545  Russia  12  526  England  9 538 
Australia  16 530  Russia  14 538  Australia  13  525  Canada  14 533 
Canada  18 527  USA  17 534  Malaysia  16 519  Russia  16  529 
Thailand  20 522  Germany  18 531  USA  19  502  USA  18 515 
Germany  23 509  Canada  19 531  England 20  496  Italy  21  493 
England 25  506  Thailand  22 525  Italy  23  479  Malaysia  22 492 
USA  28 500  France  28 498  Thailand  27 467  Thailand  24 488 
Colombia  40 385  Colombia  40 411  Turkey  31  429  Indonesia  32 435 
South Africa  41  354  South Africa  41  326  Indonesia  34  403  Turkey  33  433 
          Chile  35 392  Chile  35 420 
          Philippines 36  245  Philippines 36  345 
          South  Africa  38  275  South  Africa  38  243 
aProgramme for International Student Achievement; results refer to 15-year-old pupils for the year 2000; a score of 500 marks the OECD 
average. — bThird International Mathematics and Science Study; results refer to students at 8th grade for the years 1994 and 1995; a score of 
530 marks the average. — cRepetition of TIMSS; results refer to students at 8th grade for the year 1999; a score of 500 marks the average. 
Source: Artelt et al. (2001); Gonzalez et al. (2000). 
Russia. Colombia was placed 40th out of 41 coun-
tries participating in TIMSS, the international 
study that compares knowledge in mathematics 
and science. And even Chile, Latin America’s 
showcase in almost all other respects, only ranks 
between Indonesia and the Philippines in TIMSS 
Repeat, well behind Malaysia and Thailand, let 
alone South Korea, which is among the very top 
scorers in all three tests. 
Viewed against the background of the empirical 
results obtained from cross-country studies, one 
can argue that Latin America’s deficiencies in 
educational quality have not only had a negative 
impact on growth, but that they have also pre-
vented a stronger participation of the poor in the 
growth process. 
3.3 Institutional  Reforms 
The general catchword “institutions” encom-
passes a wide range of partly very heterogeneous 
factors. In institutional economics, a rough clas-
sification distinguishing formal and informal in-
stitutions has become the rule (see Stiglitz 2000), 
where formal institutions comprise, for example, 
the laws which frame economic activities, while 
traditions, norms, and mentalities are important 20 
informal institutions. The importance of a suit-
able set of formal institutions for economic de-
velopment has been acknowledged in much of 
the development economics literature. For a long 
time, however, a convincing approach to opera-
tionalize the concept was lacking. This implied 
that it was not possible to quantify the effect of 
institutions on economic development. This, to-
gether with the fact that institutional reforms are 
much more complex and take much longer time 
to materialize than reforms in other areas, largely 
explains why “institution-building”—or “good 
governance”, as it is now frequently called—has 
not become part of the Washington Consensus. 
Recently, there has been remarkable progress 
towards operationalizing institutions. In particu-
lar, a comprehensive World Bank project com-
piled data for a large country sample from many 
different sources (e.g. the Global Competitive-
ness Report of the World Economic Forum and 
the country reports of the Economist Intelligence 
Unit) and came up with an assessment of six 
dimensions of institutional quality, which were 
aggregated to form an overall Index of Institu-
tional Quality (Kaufmann et al. 1999). 
The six dimensions are 
•  Political stability and absence of violence, 
•  Voice and accountability, 
• Government  effectiveness, 
• Quality  of  regulations, 
•  Rule of law, and 
•  Control of corruption. 
The work by the World Bank and other similar 
efforts have provided the basis for the empirical 
analysis of institutions. From the existing em-
pirical studies, a clear picture emerges: whether 
one measures institutional quality by means of a 
broad indicator or by means of a more specific 
indicator such as the security of property rights, 
the result is always that institutions are an im-
portant explanatory variable for differences in 
economic performance (Edison 2003). Cross-
country regressions show that the six indicators 
mentioned above are roughly equally important 
for economic development (Kaufmann and Kraay 
2002). Current evidence even suggests that insti-
tutional weaknesses are the only fundamental 
reason for development failures (Acemoglu et al. 
2001; Easterly and Levine 2002; Rodrik et al. 
2002; Rodrik 2003). This implies that long-run 
differences in income levels are solely determined 
by differences in institutional quality, while short 
to medium term variations in growth rates may 
also be due to other factors such as economic 
policies. A plausible interpretation of this result is 
that “good” economic and social policies cannot 
be sustained over longer time periods if they are 
not backed by sound institutions, or that their ef-
fectiveness is low because they are not believed to 
be sustainable. Reversed causality, i.e., a positive 
impact of income levels on institutional quality, 
does not seem to exist (Kaufmann and Kraay 
2002). This means that institutional improvements 
will not occur automatically when the develop-
ment process unfolds. 
If one compares Latin American institutions 
with those in Asia, it turns out that in 7 out of 12 
Latin American sample countries the institutional 
quality falls short of the level expected given their 
income per capita, where the expected level is 
defined by the regression line that describes the 
average relationship between institutional quality 
and per capita income estimated for a large 
country sample (Figure 2). Deviations from the 
regression line are particularly pronounced in 
Argentina, Colombia, Paraguay, and Venezuela, 
and somewhat less so in Brazil, Ecuador, and 
Mexico. The Asian countries as well as Bolivia, 
Peru, and Uruguay are rather close to the regres-
sion line for most indicators. Finally, Chile and 
Costa Rica stand out: their institutional quality is 
assessed to be very high relative to per capita in-
come; assessments for Chile even approach those 
for industrialized countries like France and Japan. 
What are the factors behind the large devi-
ations from the normal pattern observed in many 
Latin American countries? One interpretation is 
that the income levels of these countries are to a 
large part determined by other factors than insti-
tutions. A less optimistic interpretation suggests 
that in large parts of Latin America the relatively 
high income levels are inherently fragile because 
they are not supported by sound institutions 
(Kaufmann and Kraay 2002). For Chile and 
Costa Rica, the second interpretation would im-
ply that the institutional preconditions for further 
economic advances are already given. 21 
Figure 2 
Index of Institutional Quality and Per Capita Income, 2002a 
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Figure 2 continued 
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aFor each indicator, the index of institutional quality can take on values between –2.5 and 2.5; a higher value of the index 
indicates higher institutional quality. 
Source: Regressions based on data from Kaufmann et al. (2003). 24 
Measurement errors provide a third possible 
explanation for the fact that the indicators of in-
stitutional quality can only partly explain differ-
ences in economic development. Both technical 
and conceptional reasons can be put forward for 
measurement errors. On the technical level, one 
has to keep in mind that the data are based on 
interviews with local experts and thus include a 
strong subjective element. The case of Argen-
tina’s dramatic downgrading in 2002 (Table A2) 
forcefully illustrates the danger of large measure-
ment errors; it can be assumed that the down-
grading mainly reflected the insecurity prevailing 
before and during the financial crisis rather than 
deteriorations in institutional quality.  
On the conceptional level, the problem is that 
despite a general consensus on the institutions 
which have to be analyzed a number of questions 
about details—e.g. finding the right balance be-
tween competition and regulation in network-
based services such as telecommunication—do 
not have a clear answer. In general, it is more 
difficult to define institutional standards which 
are suitable for a diverse set of countries than to 
propagate the dismantling of excessive interven-
tions as the Washington Consensus does. In his 
programmatic article, Stiglitz (1998) even argued 
that with respect to competition policy a consen-
sus is neither possible nor desirable, because 
economic research will not be able to identify a 
competition policy that is optimal for all coun-
tries at all times. This implies that country-spe-
cific factors have to figure prominently, which in 
turn requires a stronger disaggregation than that 
given by the six dimensions of institutional qual-
ity. The World Bank has made a step in that 
direction by developing detailed questionnaires 
for assessing the institutional quality of various 
countries, including Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia 
from Latin America (e.g. World Bank Institute 
2001). 
Work on informal institutions such as norms 
and mentalities, which in their entirety are often 
called “social capital”, used to be the domain of 
sociologists and political scientists. After the 
publication of a study by Robert Putnam (1993), 
in which the concept of social capital was used to 
explain differences in the economic performance 
of northern and southern Italy, economists have 
increasingly taken up the topic and mainly in-
vestigated whether an impact of social capital on 
economic development can be detected empiri-
cally. The operationalization of the concept for 
empirical analyses has greatly benefited from the 
so-called World Values Surveys (Inglehart et al. 
2000). During the wave of the World Values 
Surveys for the years 1995 and 1996 (the last 
wave for 2001 has not yet been processed), 
people in 41 countries—including the most im-
portant Latin American countries as well as 
China, India, and South Korea—where inter-
viewed about a multitude of dimensions of social 
capital. Economic research has mainly concen-
trated on two aspects which are assumed to be 
important determinants of the level of transaction 
costs: first, this is the level of trust among private 
agents and the trust private agents express vis-à-
vis the government, and second this is the 
strength of norms of civic cooperation. In both 
categories, Latin American countries are among 
the worst performers, whereas India and South 
Korea are roughly on par with industrialized 
countries such as Austria and the Netherlands 
(Knack and Keefer 1997). 
The existing empirical evidence, which—as in 
the case of formal institutions—has to be inter-
preted cautiously because of the high potential 
margins of error, suggests that the low stock of 
social capital has had a negative impact on Latin 
America’s development. Most notably, cross-
country studies estimate a significantly positive 
growth effect of both norms and trust (La Porta 
et al. 1997; Knack and Keefer 1997; Zak and 
Knack 2001). The transmission mechanism 
mainly runs through higher investment in physi-
cal and human capital. A high level of social 
capital encourages physical investment in several 
ways. It implies, for example, that informal net-
works can more easily substitute for formal in-
stitutions, such as formal credit markets, and that 
government officials are perceived as more 
trustworthy, which lowers perceived investment 
risks. One reason why human capital formation 
becomes more attractive in societies well en-
dowed with social capital is that hiring decisions 
will more likely be based on educational cre-
dentials rather than on personal attributes such as 
blood ties.  25 
The existing empirical studies also examined 
which factors mainly determine the level of so-
cial capital. The results show that a low degree of 
polarization in a society, i.e., a relatively egali-
tarian income distribution and ethnic homoge-
neity, strongly facilitate the formation of social 
capital. The same is true for the existence of en-
forceable laws and other formal institutions 
which constrain the ability of governments to act 
arbitrarily. In addition, high educational stan-
dards and—contrary to the case of formal insti-
tutions—high incomes have a positive impact. 
4 Towards  Sustainable  Catching-up Growth in Latin America 
Since the early 1990s, the debate about a com-
prehensive reform strategy has made consider-
able progress. The reform agenda as proposed by 
the Washington Consensus was restricted to 
formulate policies which are (technically) easy to 
implement and to monitor in order to show 
whether reform efforts were going into the right 
direction. The debate about a Post-Washington 
Consensus made it clear that these policies may 
be necessary but that they are far from sufficient. 
First, the Washington Consensus is biased to-
wards a reduction of government intervention. 
Important aspects like the restructuring of public 
expenditures, the provision of property rights, 
and a prudent regulation of the financial sector 
are mentioned but not given high priority. Second, 
the Washington Consensus neglected that the 
preconditions for positive effects of stabilization, 
opening up towards world markets, and de-
regulation are much worse in Latin America than 
in Asia. Given Latin America’s high concen-
tration of income, low diversification of produc-
tion and exports, weak human capital formation, 
segmented capital markets, and weak entre-
preneurial tradition, it proves difficult and time-
consuming to initiate a dynamic development 
process.  
The general discussion of different policy 
areas and the comparison of Latin American and 
East Asian economies in this report have shown 
that the areas of reform listed in the Washington 
Consensus, in particular the requirement of 
macroeconomic stability, are still crucial for 
emerging economies and developing countries 
alike. It has to be acknowledged that most Latin 
American countries have made considerable pro-
gress in implementing the core recommendations 
of the Washington Consensus. To achieve higher 
and more broad-based growth, reform programs 
should contain four important additional elements, 
with a focus on a dynamic development of invest-
ment and exports: 
(1) Priority for external stability in order to 
support export activities. 
(2) Adoption of best-practice technologies in 
order to speed up technical progress. 
(3)  Poverty alleviation and a more equal 
income distribution in order to allow poor 
segments of the population to participate 
in the formal economy and to allow small 
and medium-sized enterprises to develop. 
(4) Reliable formal and informal institutions 
in order to give investors an incentive to 
realize long-term projects. 
First, external stability could be supported by 
more flexible exchange rates and the prudent use 
of capital market policies, a policy mix which 
could stabilize real exchange rates as well as 
capital inflows. Competitive and stable exchange 
rates support export development by giving in-
vestors in this sector a reliable basis for calcu-
lating long-term projects. This would ease struc-
tural adjustment and foster reform processes. The 
preconditions for such a policy have improved 
considerably because of the successful reduction 
of inflation rates. Even after the recent large-scale 
devaluations, Latin American countries have been 
able to hold inflation under control. This implies 
considerably less pressure on macroeconomic 
management because the exchange rate is no 
longer bound to provide an anchor for domestic 
prices. In the same vein, increasing domestic 
savings through higher government savings and 
efforts to overcome the segmentation of capital 
markets could reduce the need for capital inflows 26 
and reduce the vulnerability of Latin American 
countries to external shocks. This would improve 
the environment for other reforms to show 
positive effects. 
Second, the adoption of best-practice technol-
ogies could be supported by technology and edu-
cation policies which are targeted at facilitating 
the transfer of technology. In this respect all pos-
sibilities given by licensing agreements and tech-
nology transfer from importers to domestic pro-
ducers of export products should be exploited. 
FDI should be encouraged in sectors where it 
competes with domestic firms in order to maxi-
mize competitive pressure. To a large extent, this 
implies a new view on FDI as a means to en-
courage the transfer of technology instead of re-
garding it primarily as a source of investment 
finance. This is another reason to increase 
domestic savings. An important precondition for 
actually improving the transfer of technology is 
that the incentives for the adoption of new tech-
nologies are matched by abilities to adopt them. 
Therefore, education policy should give priority 
to the formation of high-quality human capital, 
with an emphasis on technical and job-related 
skills. 
Third, in their efforts to alleviate poverty and 
reduce extreme inequalities, Latin American gov-
ernments should follow the example of the suc-
cessful Asian economies and focus on measures 
which enable the poor to accumulate assets and 
thus to increase their future earning capacities. 
The highest priority should be given to improve-
ments in the quality of human capital formation at 
the primary and secondary education level, e.g., 
via universal supply of learning materials and the 
training of teachers. In order to assure that the 
additional expenditures needed for this purpose 
have the intended effects, they have to be com-
plemented by institutional reforms such as greater 
school autonomy or the specification of edu-
cational standards in combination with regular 
school evaluations, which provide appropriate 
incentives for the actors participating in the 
educational system. As witnessed in East Asia, a 
strong basic education system would not only 
help alleviate poverty but also contribute to long-
run growth, i.e., it is a win-win option. Labor 
market reforms, such as cuts in severance pay-
ments, which facilitate the migration from the in-
formal sector to higher-paid formal employment 
are likely to reinforce the positive impact of 
these investments in human capital. The same is 
true for a strengthening of vocational training. 
A comprehensive titling program for land and 
property would constitute another possible win-
win option as it would help poor people to use 
their assets more productively, for instance as 
collateral. In rural areas, such a titling program 
can only be effective if it is complemented by a 
market-based land reform, which achieves a 
more equal distribution of land without relying 
on expropriations. For those in the informal 
sector lacking command over assets of any kind, 
microcredit initiatives might provide support. An 
extended access to credit along these lines would 
be a promising instrument for the establishment 
of a Mittelstand consisting of small and medium-
sized enterprises, all the more so if it was com-
bined with the deregulation of firm entry con-
ditions and the provision of extension services. 
Fourth, with respect to improvements in the 
formal institutional framework, the empirical lit-
erature does not help in setting priorities. Rather, 
it suggests that all six indicators of institutional 
quality are roughly equally important for eco-
nomic growth. For Latin America, this implies 
that most countries have to reform their institu-
tions across the board. Only a few countries may 
concentrate their reform efforts on specific in-
stitutional weaknesses. Uruguay, for example, is 
characterized by high political stability and a 
relatively low level of corruption, whereas gov-
ernment effectiveness in the provision of public 
goods is still lagging behind international stan-
dards. To derive more specific policy recom-
mendations, a stronger disaggregation than the 
identification of six broad indicators is required. 
Detailed questionnaires developed by the World 
Bank to assess the institutional quality of various 
countries show, for example, that in Colombia 
the most effective means in the fight against cor-
ruption is to contain bribes in public procure-
ment. Such specific recommendations can rarely 
be generalized for a larger group of countries. 
One exception might be the cut in severance 
payments mentioned above. 27 
If Latin America wants to strengthen its social 
capital, direct interventions, such as stricter laws 
punishing the violation of norms, will hardly be 
successful. More promising are movements to-
wards a more egalitarian income distribution, a 
higher level of education, and better formal in-
stitutions which constrain the ability of the gov-
ernment to act arbitrarily. According to recent 
empirical research, these factors would indirectly 
contribute to the formation of social capital. 
All in all, the reforms proposed in this report 
support the agenda of Kuczynski and Williamson 
(2003): deepening Washington Consensus re-
forms, reducing vulnerability, improving income 
distribution, and developing reliable institutions. 
However, with respect to reducing vulnerability, 
Kuczynski and Williamson favor more flexible 
exchange rates and higher domestic savings—as 
proposed here as well—but also an anti-cyclical 
fiscal policy and regional monitoring following 
the European idea of the Growth and Stability 
Pact. Because the preconditions for such ambi-
tious policies are not given in most Latin Ameri-
can countries, it seems to be more plausible to 
improve export performance and technological 
development in order to reduce vulnerability and, 
at the same time, to foster economic growth. An 
important insight gained by the Post-Washington 
Consensus debate is that in order to achieve these 
goals social mobility and reliable institutions 
matter more than assumed at the beginning of the 
1990s. 
Taken together, export orientation, technology 
transfer, poverty alleviation, and institution-
building could lead to a more flexible economic 
structure and a more dynamic development of 
investment and exports, which would in turn be 
reflected in higher and more equitable growth. In 
order to start such a process, the countries need 
to design their own strategies. This is because 
most reforms, especially institution-building, 
have to be tailored to domestic conditions. This 
is the second important insight from the Post-
Washington Consensus debate. 
The poverty reduction strategy papers 
(PRSPs), which have to be set up by poor and 
highly indebted countries in order to get HIPC 
debt reductions, could also provide a blueprint 
for the development of national reform strategies 
for more advanced countries. PRSPs establish a 
framework for a national dialog, integrate poor 
households into the decision-making process, 
and improve the awareness of reform targets 
through quantitative targets (Schweickert et al. 
2003). The fact that the countries themselves 
have to design strategies in the first place im-
proves the identification with reforms (owner-
ship). It is a well established fact that the failure 
of World Bank and IMF programs was to a large 
extent a lack of ownership and, hence, support in 
developing countries (Thiele and Wiebelt 2000). 
The chances that such comprehensive reforms 
could be implemented in Latin American coun-
tries have improved over the recent years. First, 
the Post-Washington Consensus debate has 
paved the way towards deeper reforms because 
economists, international institutions, and policy 
makers seem to agree that the role of govern-
ments should be more active but also more fo-
cused than the one described in the Washington 
Consensus. Second, a reorientation towards a 
pro-poor growth strategy should not endanger 
fiscal stability. Fiscal policy could improve tax 
revenue by increasing income taxation using a 
moderately progressive tax structure. Fiscal 
budgets also allow for more restructuring in 
favor of investment in human capital formation. 
Third, macroeconomic stability has improved 
considerably, with a range of countries now ap-
proaching single-digit inflation rates. This will 
reduce the probability of crises and free the re-
sources of policy makers for concentrating on a 
credible and comprehensive reform package 
rather than muddling through with ad hoc 
measures. Finally, in some countries like Mexico 
and Chile, indicators on institutions improved 
over relatively short time periods, indicating that 
even in this most difficult reform area progress is 
possible. 
Unfortunately, international support for com-
prehensive reforms has rather weakened. Pro-
gress with respect to reforms of the international 
financial system has slowed down. Industrialized 
countries also prefer bilateral or regional inte-
gration schemes, which allows them to use their 
superior political leverage. Instead, they should 
open up for exports from emerging market econ-
omies in a most favored nation fashion in order 
to avoid discrimination and maximize learning-
by-doing and help emerging market economies 28 
to design and implement comprehensive national 
PRSPs. 
Because careful optimism is justified with 
respect to the potential of Latin American coun-
tries to implement pro-poor growth strategies, 
industrialized countries would be well advised to 
support this process in their own interest because 




Index of Economic Freedom for Latin America and Asia, 1995–2003a 
 Chile  South 
Korea 
Thailand  Argentina  Uruguay  Bolivia  Malaysia Peru  Costa  Rica  Mexico Brazil  Vene-
zuela 
China India  Average 
  Score 
1995  2.6 2.2 2.4 2.8 2.9 3.1 2.4 3.3 2.9 2.9 3.3 3.0 3.6 3.8 2.6 
1996  2.6 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.6 3.5 3.6 3.9 2.6 
1997  2.2 2.3 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.3 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.8 2.6 
1998  2.2 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.9 3.0 3.3 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.8 2.5 
1999  2.1 2.2 2.4 2.1 2.7 2.8 2.6 2.6 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.6 3.8 2.5 
2000  2.0 2.4 2.7 2.1 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.9 3.0 3.5 3.3 3.4 3.8 2.5 
2001  2.0 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.4 3.0 2.5 2.7 3.0 3.3 3.6 3.6 3.9 2.4 
2002  1.9 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 3.1 2.8 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.7 3.6 3.6 2.5 
2003  2.0 2.7 2.6 3.0 2.5 2.7 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.5 3.6 3.5 2.5 
Average  2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8 3.0 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.8 2.5 
Change –0.6  0.6  0.2  0.2 –0.4 –0.5  0.6 –0.5 –0.3 –0.1 –0.3  0.5 –0.1 –0.3 –0.1 
  Trade policy 
1995  4 3 3 4 3 2 3 5 4 3 4 4 5 5  3.3 
1996  4 2 3 4 3 2 3 4 4 3 4 4 5 5  3.1 
1997  2 3 3 4 2 2 5 3 4 3 4 4 5 5  3.1 
1998  2 3 3 4 2 2 3 2 4 3 4 3 5 5  2.8 
1999  2 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 4 2 4 3 5 5  2.7 
2000  2 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 3 3 5 3 5 5  2.8 
2001  2 3 2 3 1 2 4 3 2 2 4 4 5 5  2.6 
2002  2 3 2 4 3 2 4 3 2 2 4 4 5 5  2.8 
2003  2 3 4 4 3 3 3 4 2 2 4 4 5 5  3.0 
Average  2.4 2.9 2.9 3.7 2.3 2.1 3.4 3.1 3.2 2.6 4.1 3.7 5.0 5.0 2.9 
Change  –2.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0  –1.0  –2.0  –1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  –0.3 
  Fiscal burden 
1995  3  2.5 2  2.5 3 3 4 2 3  2.5 3 2 3 5  2.5 
1996  2.5 3 2  2.5  3.5 3 4 2 3 3  3.5 3 2  4.5  2.6 
1997  3 3 2 3  3.5 3 3 3 3 3  3.5 3 2 4  2.6 
1998  3 3 2 2  3.5 3 3 3 3 3  3.5 3 2 4  2.6 
1999  3  2.5 2 2  3.5  3.5 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3  2.5 
2000  3  2.5 3 3  3.5  3.5 3 2 3 3 4 3 3 3  2.7 
2001  3  3 2.5  3 3.5  3  3 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 2.6 
2002  3 3.5 2.5  3 3.5 3.5  3 2.5  3 3.5 3.5 2.5  3 3.5 2.7 
2003  2.5 3  2.5 3  3.5 3 3  2.5 3  3.5  2.5 3 3 4  2.6 
Average  2.9 2.9 2.3 2.7 3.4 3.2 3.2 2.5 2.9 3.1 3.3 2.7 2.6 3.8 2.6 
Change  –0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0  –1.0 0.5 0.0 1.0  –0.5 1.0 0.0  –1.0 0.1 
  Government intervention 
1995  1 1  1.5 2 2 3 2 3 2 1 2 1 4 3  1.8 
1996  1 2  1.5 2 2 3 3 1  2.5 2 3 3 4 3  2.1 
1997  1  1.5 1 2 2 3 3 1  2.5  2.5 3 2 4 3  2.0 
1998  1.5  2.5  1.5 2 2 3 3  1.5  2.5 3 3 3 4 3  2.2 
1999  1  1.5  1.5 2 2 3 3  1.5  2.5 3 3 3 4 3  2.1 
2000  1  2.5 3 2 2 2 3  1.5  2.5 2 3 2 4 3  2.1 
2001  1  2.5  2.5  2.5 2 2 2  1.5 3 2 3 2 4 3  2.1 
2002  1  3.5 3  2.5 2 2 3  2.5  2.5 2 3 3 4 3  2.3 
2003  2 4  1.5 2  2.5 2 3 3  2.5 3 3 2 4 3  2.3 
Average  1.2 2.3 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.6 2.8 1.8 2.5 2.3 2.9 2.3 4.0 3.0 2.1 
Change 1.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.5  –1.0 1.0 0.0 0.5 2.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 
  Monetary policy 
1995  4 2 2 5 5 4 2 5 4 4 5 5 3 3  3.3 
1996  4 3 2 5 5 3 2 5 4 3 5 5 4 3  3.3 
1997  3 2 2 5 5 3 2 5 4 5 5 5 4 3  3.3 
1998  3 2 2 3 5 3 2 5 4 5 5 5 3 3  3.1 
1999  3 2 2 2 5 3 2 4 4 5 5 5 3 3  3.0 
2000  2 3 3 1 4 3 2 3 4 4 5 5 1 3  2.7 
2001  2 1 1 1 3 2 2 2 3 4 4 5 1 3  2.1 
2002  2 1 1 1 3 2 1 2 3 4 3 5 1 2  1.9 
2003  2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 3 3 4 1 2  1.7 
Average  2.8 2.0 1.8 2.7 4.1 2.7 1.8 3.6 3.7 4.1 4.4 4.9 2.3 2.8 2.7 
Change –2.0  0.0 –1.0 –4.0 –3.0 –3.0 –1.0 –4.0 –1.0 –1.0 –2.0 –1.0 –2.0 –1.0 –1.6 29 
Table A1 continued 
 Chile  South 
Korea 
Thailand Argentina Uruguay  Bolivia  Malaysia  Peru  Costa  Rica Mexico  Brazil  Vene-
zuela 
China India  Average 
  Capital flows 
1995  2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3  2.1 
1996  2 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3  2.2 
1997  2 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3  2.2 
1998  2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3  2.1 
1999  2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 4  2.1 
2000  2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 3 3 3 4  2.2 
2001  2 2 2 2 2 1 4 2 2 3 3 3 4 4  2.3 
2002  2 2 2 2 2 1 4 2 2 3 3 3 4 3  2.2 
2003  2 2 3 3 2 1 4 2 2 3 3 3 4 3  2.3 
Average  2.0 2.3 2.4 2.1 2.0 1.7 3.3 2.0 2.0 2.3 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 2.2 
Change 0.0  –1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0  –1.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.2 
  Banking and finance 
1995  3 2 3 3 3 4 3 2 3 4 3 2 3 4  2.6 
1996  3 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 4 3 3 3 4  2.4 
1997  3 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 4 3 3 3 4  2.4 
1998  3 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 4 3 3 3 4  2.4 
1999  3 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 4 3 3 3 4  2.5 
2000  3 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 4 3 3 3 4  2.5 
2001  3 3 3 2 2 2 4 2 3 3 3 3 4 4  2.6 
2002  2 3 3 2 2 2 4 2 3 2 3 3 4 4  2.4 
2003  2 3 3 4 2 2 4 2 3 2 3 3 4 4  2.6 
Average  2.8 2.6 3.0 2.3 2.1 2.2 3.3 2.0 3.0 3.4 3.0 2.9 3.3 4.0 2.5 
Change  –1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0  –1.0  –2.0 1.0 0.0 0.0  –2.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0  –0.1 
  Wages and prices 
1995  3 2 3 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3  2.1 
1996  3 2 3 2 2 1 3 2 2 4 3 3 3 4  2.3 
1997  2 2 3 2 2 1 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 4  2.2 
1998  2 2 3 2 2 1 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 4  2.2 
1999  2 2 3 2 2 1 3 2 2 3 2 3 3 4  2.1 
2000  2 2 3 2 2 1 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 4  2.1 
2001  2 2 2 1 2 1 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 4  1.9 
2002  2 2 2 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 4 3 4  2.1 
2003  2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 4 3 3  2.1 
Average  2.2 2.0 2.7 1.8 2.0 1.2 2.9 2.0 2.0 2.7 2.4 3.2 3.0 3.8 2.1 
Change  –1.0 0.0  –1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0  –1.0  –1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0  –0.1 
  Property rights 
1995  1 1 1 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 4 3  2.1 
1996  1 1 1 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 3  2.2 
1997  1 1 1 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 3  2.1 
1998  1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 3  2.1 
1999  1 1 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 3  2.1 
2000  1 1 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 3  2.2 
2001  1 1 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3  2.4 
2002  1 1 2 3 2 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 3  2.5 
2003  1 2 2 4 2 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 3  2.6 
Average  1.0 1.1 1.7 2.4 2.2 3.1 2.3 3.1 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.3 4.0 3.0 2.3 
Change 0.0 1.0 1.0 2.0  –1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
  Regulations 
1995  2 3 3 2 3 4 2 4 3 4 4 2 4 4  2.8 
1996  2 3 3 2 3 4 2 4 3 4 4 3 4 4  2.8 
1997  2 3 3 2 3 4 2 4 3 4 3 3 4 4  2.8 
1998  2 3 3 2 3 4 2 4 3 4 3 3 4 4  2.8 
1999  2 3 3 2 3 4 2 3 3 4 3 3 4 4  2.7 
2000  2 3 3 2 3 4 2 3 3 4 3 3 4 4  2.7 
2001  2 3 3 2 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 4  2.8 
2002  2 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 4  2.9 
2003  3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 4  2.9 
Average  2.1 3.0 3.0 2.2 3.0 4.0 2.3 3.7 3.0 3.9 3.2 3.2 4.0 4.0 2.8 
Change 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0  –1.0  –1.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
  Black market 
1995  3 2 2 3 3 5 2 5 3 3 3 5 4 5  3.0 
1996  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  1.8 
1997  3 2 2 2 3 4 2 4 3 3 4 5 4 5  2.9 
1998  2 2 2 2 3 4 2 4 3 3 4 5 4 5  2.8 
1999  2 2 2 2 3 4 2 4 3 3 4 5 4 5  2.8 
2000  2 2 2 2 3 4 2 4 3 3 4 5 4 5  2.8 
2001  2 2 2 3 3 4 2 4 3 3 4 5 4 5  2.9 
2002  1.5  3 3.5 3.5  3 4.5  3 3.5  3 3.5 3.5  4 3.5  4 2.9 
2003  1.5  3 3.5 3.5  3 4.5  3 3.5  3 3.5 3.5  4 3.5  4 2.9 
Average  2.1 2.2 2.3 2.6 2.9 4.0 2.2 3.8 2.9 3.0 3.6 4.4 3.7 4.4 2.8 
Change  –1.5 1.0 1.5 0.5 0.0  –0.5 1.0  –1.5 0.0 0.5 0.5  –1.0  –0.5  –1.0  –0.1 
aThe scale for each of the ten factors runs from 1 (best) to 5 (worst). For determining the score, the factors are weighted equally. 
Source: Heritage Foundation (various issues); own calculations. 30 
Table A2: 
Index of Institutional Quality for Latin America and Asia, 1996 and 2002a 
 Argentina  Bolivia Brazil  Chile  China  Costa 
Rica 
Ecuador India  Colombia  Malaysia Mexico  Peru  Paraguay  South 
Korea 
Thailand Uruguay Venezuela 
  Overall institutional quality 
1996  0.36  –0.24 0.00 1.03  –0.24 0.66  –0.41  –0.15  –0.25 0.61  –0.11  –0.26  –0.24 0.53 0.18 0.60  –0.41 
2002  –0.58  –0.38 0.02 1.27  –0.34 0.81  –0.66  –0.19  –0.66 0.45 0.13  –0.18  –1.01 0.67 0.25 0.70  –0.88 
  Quality of regulations 
1996  0.66 0.66 0.13 1.28  –0.10 0.54  –0.10  –0.13 0.37 0.70 0.46 0.51 0.45 0.55 0.38 0.80  –0.12 
2002  –0.84  –0.11 0.26 1.50  –0.41 0.74  –0.60  –0.34  –0.04 0.58 0.49 0.24  –0.56 0.86 0.34 0.48  –0.54 
  Rule of law 
1996  0.27  –0.62  –0.24 1.19  –0.43 0.61  –0.38  –0.01  –0.44 0.80  –0.11  –0.33  –0.48 0.77 0.46 0.49  –0.62 
2002  –0.73  –0.60  –0.30 1.30  –0.22 0.67  –0.60 0.07  –0.75 0.58  –0.22  –0.44  –1.12 0.88 0.30 0.56  –1.04 
  Control of corruption 
1996  –0.11  –0.81 –0.10  1.14 –0.01  0.71 –0.70 –0.29 –0.40  0.48 –0.31 –0.09 –0.46  0.51 –0.30  0.42 –0.67 
2002  –0.77  –0.82 –0.05  1.55 –0.41  0.88 –1.02 –0.25 –0.47  0.38 –0.19 –0.20 –1.22  0.33 –0.15  0.79 –0.94 
  Voice and accountability 
1996  0.58 0.10 0.22 0.89  –1.22 1.30 0.07 0.27  –0.06  –0.05  –0.21  –0.69  –0.37 0.68 0.01 0.74 0.06 
2002  0.12 0.01 0.28 1.12  –1.38 1.15  –0.06 0.38  –0.55  –0.27 0.33 0.22  –0.53 0.63 0.20 0.95  –0.41 
  Political stability 
1996  0.50  –0.28  –0.01 0.72 0.23 0.79  –0.66  –0.55  –0.97 0.92  –0.27  –0.72 0.10 0.19 0.21 0.69  –0.39 
2002  –0.74  –0.20 0.17 1.04 0.22 1.06  –0.70  –0.84  –1.78 0.51 0.22  –0.67  –1.33 0.49 0.55 0.91  –1.20 
  Government effectiveness 
1996  0.27  –0.49  –0.19 0.95 0.11 0.02  –0.66  –0.16 0.02 0.81  –0.22  –0.24  –0.67 0.48 0.31 0.46  –0.69 
2002  –0.49  –0.53  –0.22 1.19 0.18 0.37  –0.96  –0.13  –0.39 0.92 0.15  –0.47  –1.29 0.84 0.28 0.51  –1.14 
aValues for each of the indices run from –2.5 to +2.5. The index for overall institutional quality is the unweighted average of the subindices. 
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2003); own calculations. 
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